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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
GOTTHARDT v. NATIONAL RAILROAD 
PASSENGER CORP. 
191 F.3D 1148 (9TH CIR. 1999) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Gotthardt v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.: the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
front pay awards2 in Title VII cases are not subject to the com-
pensatory damages caps stated in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (b)(3).3 
This was an issue of first impression in the Ninth Circuit.4 
Other circuits had decided the issue and were split.6 The 
Ninth Circuit joined the majority of the federal circuits in 
1 
Gotthardt v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 191 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 1999). 
2 
Front pay is the monetary equivalent of reinstatement. It represents what the 
plaintiff would have earned between the date of the award and at some point in the 
future. As was true for Meriola, it is sometimes appropriate to grant front pay until 
the plaintitl's retirement. 5 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 2d § 92.12 (Matthew 
Bender 1999) 
3 • 
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1155. 42 U.S.C.A § 1981a(b)(3) states, m relevant part, 
that "[t]he sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section 
for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering. inconvenience. mental anguish, 
loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive 
damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party ... 
[$300,000 in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of 20 
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.] 
4 
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1151. 
6 
See id. at 1153 (citing Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d 1193, 1202-1204 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(stating that front pay awards do fall within the caps); Martini v. Federal Nat1 Mort-
gage Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1336, 1348-1349 (D.C. Cir. 1999), Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 
164 F.3d 545, 555 (lOth Cir. 1999), Kramer v. Logan County Sch. Dist. No. R-l, 157 
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holding that front pay awards are not subject to the section 
1981a caps.6 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Meriohi Z. Gotthardt ("Meriola") began working for the Na-
tional Railroad Passenger Corporation, dba Amtrak ("Am-
trak"), in 1988.7 She was an assistant engineer, working as a 
"fireman" [sic] on Amtrak's trains.8 In 1990 and 1991, Meriola 
attempted to qualify for engineering positions on the Oakland 
to Santa Barbara Route.9 Amtrak requires its engineers to 
qualify for each route they cover.lO Qualifying for a particular 
route consists of passing an oral examination and actually per-
forming the route with a supervisor present. 11 This "checkride" 
allows the applicant to demonstrate his or her skill in handling 
the train and negotiating the route.12 Meriola attempted to 
qualify for the Oakland to Santa Barbara Route fifteen times. 13 
As a result, she was removed from service in July, 1991 be-
cause she was unable to operate the train in a safe manner.14 
However, Meriola eventually qualified for the route in October, 
1991.15 During two of her attempts to qualify for the route, 
6 
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1154. 
7 





See ,d. at 1151, 1158. 
10 
See id. at 115l. 
11 




See id. at 1158. 
14 
See id. Observers stated that Meriola did not operate the train in a safe manner. 
1d. at 1159. 
15 
See id. at 1158. 
2
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Meriola endured hostile work environment sexual 
h 16 arassment. 
In 1993, Meriola took a position as an "overnight shift yard 
engineer. "17 She took this position, in part, because she was 
sus}:~nded due to a rules violation while operating a train. 1S 
During her tenure as an overnight shift yard engineer, 
Meriola's supervisors called her degrading names and engaged 
in other harassing behavior while at work. 19 Based on the har-
assment she endured during this period, Meriola sued Amtrak 
on September 13, 1993, alleging Title VII violations ("Got-
thardt F').20 Meriola asserted that she had been discriminated 
against because of her sex, subjected to hostile work environ-
ment sexual harassment,21 retaliated againse2 and falsely im-
. d 23 pnsone . 
16 See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1158. The opinion does not describe the conduct that 
created the hostile work environment. 
17 
See id. at 1151. The opinion does not indicate whether this position was a demo-
tion; nor does it describe Meriola's duties while she held this position. 
1S See id. at 1158, 1159. 
19 
See id. at 1151. The opinion does not describe the "other harassing behavior" 
that Meriola endured. 
20 See id. at 1152. Title VII states that "lilt shall be an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer to (1) fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or oth-
erwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, relig-
ion, sex or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate or classifY his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 
U.S.C.A § 2000e-2(a). 
21 See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1152. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion defines hostile environment sexual harassment as conduct which "has the pur-
pose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or 
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." Guidelines on 
Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 CFR § 1604.11(a)(3). Such conduct must be "severe 
or pervasive" to constitute actionable sexual harassment under Title VII. See Harris 
v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21-22 (1993). 
22 See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1152. The following elements constitute a prima facie 
case of retaliation under Title VII: (1) plaintiff engaged in protected activity under 
Title VII (e.g., filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion) (2) the employer made an employment decision adverse to the plaintiff, and (3) 
3
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Amtrak eliminated Meriola's overnight shift yard engineer 
position in April 1995.24 Consequently, Meriola applied for an 
engineer position on the "Capitol Run," a route which travels 
through Oakland, San Jose and Sacramento.25 She was 
trained for this route and scheduled a checkride to demon-
strate her skill on the route in the presence of a supervisor.26 
Unfortunately, Meriola never completed the qualification proc-
ess for the Capitol Run.27 She took a medical leave beginning 
May 5, 1995 and never returned to work.28 Meriola's treating 
psychologist, Dr. Jeanne Rivoire, later attributed this illness to 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD"), which was caused by 
the harassment Meriola endured while working for Amtrak.29 
Soon after leaving Amtrak, Meriola filed a second action on 
July 5, 1995 alleging similar Title VII violations ("Gotthardt 
11").30 The United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California consolidated Meriola's actions.31 
plaintiff must demonstrate a causal link between the protected activity and the em-
ployer's action. See Anderson v. Reno, 190 F.3d 930, 938 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 
Yartzoffv. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987». 
23 
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1152. False Imprisonment is a common law tort. The 
plaintiff must prove that defendant restrained him, either by physical barriers or 
threats of force. Plaintiff must be aware of such a restraint and that such restraint 
was against his will. See W. PAGE KEETON, ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw 
OF TORTS § 11, at 47-54 (5th ed. 1984). 
24 See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1151-1152. The opinion does not indicate whether 
Amtrak gave a reason for eliminating Meriola's overnight shift yard engineer position. 
25 
Id. at 1152. 
26 
See id. 
27 S id ee . 
28 See id. at 1152, 1155. 
29 
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1152, 1155-1156. Dr. Rivoire was also Meriola's ex-
pert at trial. Id. 
30 See id. at 1152. The opinion does not specifically describe any other events that 
gave rise to Gotthardt II,. although there were indications that Meriola's medical leave 
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The district court dismissed the false imprisonment and 
retaliation claims in Gotthardt 1.32 Furthermore, the court 
found that Meriola failed to prove employment discrimination 
based on sex.33 She had, however, proved that Amtrak was 
liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment.34 
Nevertheless, the court did not award damages on the hostile 
environment claim because Meriola "failed to present testi-
mony regarding the extent of her damages.,,35 Meriola ap-
pealed this denial of backpay to the Ninth Circuit.36 
Gotthardt II was tried to a jury.37 The jury returned a ver-
dict in Meriola's favor on the hostile work environment claim 
and awarded her $350,000 in compensatory damages.38 How-
ever, the jury found against her on the retaliation and sex-
based discrimination claims.39 The district court adopted the 
verdict, but reduced the damages award to $300,000 pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), which caps compensatory damages 
in Title VII cases.40 
Next, the district court calculated equitable relief.41 The 
court made three crucial findings after an evidentiary 
hearing.42 First, the court concluded that Meriola's PTSD pre-
vented her from returning to work at Amtrak. 43 Second, given 




See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1152. 
35 S 'd ee I • 
36 
See id. 
nS 'd h ee I • Gotthardt I was not decided by a jury because the claims in t at action 
arose before Congress amended Title VII 1991, which provided for jury trials in Title 




See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1152. 
40 See id. See also, supra, note 3. 
41 




See id. Dr. Rivoire's testimony indicated that Meriola's stressed condition pre-
sented her from working altogether. See id. at 1156. Moreover, it is often the case 
5
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Meriola's age and background, the court found that she would 
be unable to begin another career.44 Third, the court deter-
mined that, but for the PTSD, Meriola would have qualified for 
the Capitol Run route, which she had applied for before she fell 
ill.45 Further, the court assumed that Meriola would have re-
mained on the Capitol Run route until she retired.46 Based on 
the findings described above, the court awarded $124,010.46 in 
back pay.47 The court also awarded front pay in the amount of 
$603,928.37.48 Amtrak did not appeal the findings of 
liability.49 Rather, Amtrak appealed the remedies fashioned by 
the district court. 50 Meriola appealed the denial of back pay in 
Gotthardt 1.51 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS 
As stated in Part I, the primary issue on appeal was 
whether the damages caps specified in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) 
that hostility between the parties makes reinstatement inappropriate, either because 
of the litigation, or because of the hostilities that existed prior to the litigation. See 5 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 2d § 92.12 (Matthew Bender 1999). 
44 . 
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1152. Meriola was 59 years old at the time of the 
award. rd. 
~ . 
See id. The court based this assumption on several facts. First, she was suffi-
ciently skilled and experienced to handle the route. Second, the route was less diffi-
cult than other Amtrak routes. Third, although she had missed work on some occa-
sions, there was no evidence that these absences were habitual or would be a problem 
in the future. All of these facts were appropriate considerations in calculating front 
pay. See id. at 1157. 
46 
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1152-1153 
47 
See id. This amount represented the pay she would have received from the date 
of qualification for the Capitol Run to the date the court issued its findings, minus the 
disability benefits she had already received, plus prejudgment interest. See id. 
48 See id. at 1152. This amount represented the pay and benefits Meriola would 
have received if she had worked as an engineer on the Capitol Run from the date of 
the court's decision until she reached Amtrak's mandatory retirement age of 70 years 
old, discounted to the present cash value. See id. 
49 
See id. at 1153. 
50 S 'd ee I • 
61 
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1153. 
6
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apply to front pay awards. 52 The district court concluded that 
section 1981a(b)(3) does not cap front pay awards.53 The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 54 
The Ninth Circuit also determined whether front pay was 
appropriate. 55 The court found that the district court did not 
err in awarding and calculating front pay as it did.56 Finally, 
the Ninth Circuit addressed Meriola's argument that the dis-
trict court erred in denying back pay in Gotthardt 1.57 Again, 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 58 
A. WHETHER FRONT PAY IS SUBJECT TO THE 42 U.S.C.A § 1981A 
CAPS 
The Ninth Circuit focused on the relationship between sec-
tions 1981a, and 2000e-5(g).59 Section 1981a was enacted in 
1991 and authorized compensatory and punitive damages in 
Title VII cases.60 However, section 1981a(b)(3) also caps the 
amount of damages, depending on the size of the employer.61 
In Meriola's case, such damages are capped at $300,000.62 The 
Ninth Circuit noted that, in addition to the damages described 





See id. at 1151. 1159. 
55 
See id. at 1155. 
56 S ·d ee, . 
57 
See Gotthardt. 191 F.3d at 1158. 
58 S ·d ee, . at 1158. 1159. 
59 See id. at 1153. 42 U.S.C.A § 2000e-5(g) states. in relevant part: "If the court 
finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in ... an unlawful employment 
practice •... the court may enjoin the respondent ... and order ... reinstatement ... with or 
without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 
60 See Gotthardt. 191 F.3d at 1153. Prior to 1991. Title VII plaintiffs could not re-
cover these types of damages. See id. 
61 
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(b)(3). 
62 See Gotthardt. 191 F.3d at 1153 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(bX3». Because 
Amtrak has more than 300 employees. section 1981a(b)(3) caps damages at $300.000. 
7
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above, Title VII itself has always authorized courts to grant 
equitable relief to successful plaintiffs.63 Further, it is impor-
tant to recognize that when section 1981a was enacted, Con-
gress left these provisions intact.54 
With the foregoing principles in mind, the Ninth Circuit 
stated that whether front pay is subject to the caps depends on 
whether the award is a future pecuniary loss as described in 
section 1981a(b)(3) or equitable relief authorized under section 
2000e-5(g).65 The circuit split arises here.66 For example, in 
Hudson v. Reno,67the Sixth Circuit held that front pay falls 
within the cap because front pay is not specifically stated as a 
type of authorized equitable relief in section 2000e-5(g).68 The 
Hudson court noted that Sixth Circuit precedents have consis-
tently treated front pay as a legal, rather than equitable, rem-
edy.69 Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit stated in Hudson that 
the future pecuniary loss described in § 1981a(b)(3) could only 
be front pay.70 In contrast to the Sixth Circuit's approach, the 
majority of circuits have held that front pay is an equitable 
remedy within the meaning of § 2000e-5(g) and is therefore 





65 S id ee . 
66 
See id. See infra note8 67-71 for citations to cases illustrating the circuit split. 
67 
130 F.3d l193 (6th Cir. 1997) (cited in Gotthardt v. National Railroad, 191 F.3d 
l148, l153-l154 (9th Cir. 1999». 
68 
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at l153-l154. 
69 
See Hudson, 130 F.3d at 1203 (cited in Gotthardt v. National Railroad, 191 F. 3d 
l148, l153-l154 (9th Cir. 1999». 
70 See id. at 1204 (cited in Gotthardt v. National Railroad, 191 F.3d l148, l154 (9th 
Cir.1999). 
71 See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at l154 (citing Martini v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 
178 F.3d 1336, 1348-1349 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 
545, 555 (lOth Cir. 1999), pet. for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. May 12, 1999) (No. 
98-1829); Kramer v. Logan County Sch. Dist. No. R-1, 157 F.3d 620, 626 (8th Cir. 
1998». 
8
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The Ninth Circuit examined the language and intent of sec-
tion 1981a.72 The court stated that Congress included lan-
guage in section 1981a that evinced an intent to leave the 
courts' existing equitable powers intact.73 Moreover, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that, before section 1981a was enacted, courts 
had treated front pay as an equitable remedy under section 
2000e-5(g).74 This remedy was used to make plaintiffs whole 
when reinstatement was impractical. 75 Since Congress is pre-
sumed "to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to 
the incorporated law," the Ninth Circuit stated that Congress 
understood front pay to be one of the existing equitable reme-
dies and therefore not within the cap imposed by section 
1981a(b)(3).76 
The cc.;rt also quoted portions of the Congressional Record 
which indicated that the d~,~},fters of section 1981a recognized 
that front pay was an existing equitable remedy not subject to 
the section 1981a caps.77 In addition, the Ninth Circuit found 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") 
view of this issue persuasive.7s The EEOC stated that front 
pay is one of the types of equitable relief contemplated in sec-
tion 2000e-5(g) and is therefore not a type of compensatory 
72 
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1154. 
73 
See id (citing 42 U.S.C.A § 1981a(a)(I), (b)(2». Section 1981a(a)(1) states, in 
relevant part, that "the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive 
damages as allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any relief author-
ized by section [2000e-5(g)] of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... " (emphasis added). Sec-
tion 1981a(b)(2) states, in relevant part, that "[c]ompensatory damages awarded under 
this section shall not include backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief 
authorized under section [2000e-51 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." (emphasis added). 
74 S 'd ee I • 
75 S id ee . 
76 S 'd ee I • 
77 
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1154. 
7S 
See id at 1154 n.6 (citing EEOC: Policy Guidance on Compensatory and Punitive 
Damages under 1991 Civil Rights Act, 8 Lab. ReI. Rep. Fair Empl. Prac. Manual 
(BNA) 405:7091,7094 (July 7, 1992». 
9
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damages subject to the section 1981a caps.79 The Ninth Circuit 
stated that, since the EEOC is charged with interpreting Title 
VII, it was appropriate for the court to defer to the agency's 
. t t t' 80 In erpre a Ion. 
Based on the analysis described above, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that front pay was not subject to the section 1981a 
caps.81 The court then discussed the district court's calculation 
of Meriola's front pay award.82 
B. WHETHER MERIOLA'S FRONT PAY AWARD WAS APPROPRIATE 
The Ninth Circuit's discussion centered on two determina-
tions: first, the preliminary question of whether awarding front 
pay was appropriate; and second, the actual calculation of the 
award.83 
Before front pay is available, a Title VII plaintiff must 
prove that the employer's unlawful practices caused a loss of 
employment.84 Stated another way, this causal connection re-
quires a plaintiff to show that he or she was forced to leave the 
job because of discriminatory working conditions. 85 The dis-
trict court concluded that there was a nexus between Meriola's 
intolerable working conditions and her loss of employment.86 
The district court based its finding primarily on the testimony 
79 
See id (citing EEOC: Policy Guidance on Compensatory and Punitive Damages 
under 1991 Civil Rights Act, 8 Lab. ReI. Rep. Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 
405:7091, 7094 (July 7, 1992». 
80 
See id (citing Wilderness Soc'y v. Dombeck, 168 F.3d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1999». 
81 
See id. at 1155. 
82 
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1155. 
S3 . 
See ,d. at 1155, 1156. 




See id. Specifically, the district court found, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that 
Amtrak's hostile work environment caused Meriola's PTSD, which forced her to take a 
medical leave and eventually resign. There was some indication that Amtrak forced 
Gotthardt to take the medical leave. See id. 
10
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of Meriola's psychologist, Dr. Rivoire.87 Dr. Rivoire testified 
that the hostile working environment at Amtrak caused 
Meriola's prrSD, which in turn caused Meriola to resign.88 In 
reviewing for clear error, the Ninth Circuit found that the dis-
trict court's determination was plausible and therefore de-
clined to disturb the ruling.89 
Amtrak argued on appeal that the district court should 
have ordered reinstatement rather than front pay.90 While it is 
true that reinstatement is the preferred remedy, front pay is 
an appropriate award when reinstatement is impossible.91 
Amtrak argued that reinstatement was appropriate because it 
could offer Meriola several positions in a non-hostile work en-
. t 92 Vlronmen. 
However, the district court concluded that Meriola's medi-
cal and psychological condition made returning to Amtrak im-
possible.93 Furthermore, Meriola's circumstances prevented 
her from entering another career.94 Therefore, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discre-
t . 95 Ion. 
87 
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1156 & n.9 
88 See id. at 1156. 
89 S id ee . 
90 S 'd ee, . 
91 S id ee . 
92 
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1156. 
93 See id. Dr. Rivoire'8 testimony indicated that Meriola's stressed condition pre-
sented her from working altogether. See id. Moreover, it is often the case that hostil-
ity between the parties makes reinstatement inappropriate, either because of the 
litigation, or because of the hostilities that existed prior to the litigation. See LARsON, 
5 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 2d § 92.12 (1999). 
94 See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1156. Meriola's medical and psychological condition, 
age, and background indicated that returning to Amtrak, or working anywhere else, 
would be impossible. See id. at 1152, 1156. 
95 S 'd ee, . 
11
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Amtrak next argued that the district court's front pay cal-
culation was incorrect.96 Specifically, Amtrak asserted that the 
court abused its discretion by determining that Meriola would 
have qualified for the Capitol Run and worked steadily on that 
route until she retired.97 Amtrak further argued that the dis-
trict court failed to account for Meriola's duty to mitigate her 
damages and the effect of disability payments in the future.98 
The Ninth Circuit addressed Amtrak's arguments in turn.99 
As to Meriola's projected career path, the Ninth Circuit stated 
that the calculation was only appropriate if Meriola would 
have qualified for the Capitol Run absent the hostile working 
environment at Amtrak. 100 The Ninth Circuit concluded that 
Meriola possessed the skills and ability to qualify for the Capi-
tol Run. lOl 
The Ninth Circuit also rejected Amtrak's contention that 
Meriola's award should have accounted for her duty to mitigate 
her damages. l02 Specifically, the court stated that, since her 
PTSD rendered her unable to work at any job, she could not be 
charged with a duty to find work in order to mitigate her dam-
ages. l03 Finally, the Ninth Circuit turned to Amtrak's asser-
tion that future disability benefits that Meriola might receive 
should be deducted from her award. 104 The court rejected Am-
trak's argument because Amtrak could only speculate as to 






See id. Specifically, Amtrak argued that future disability payments should have 
been deducted from Meriola's award. See id. 
99 
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1156-1158. 
100 
See id. at 1156. 
101 See id. at 1157. Amtrak supervisors reported that Meriola was "a highly capa-
ble engineer." Evidence also indicated that the Capitol Run was less difficult than 
other routes. These facts were sufficient to support the finding that Meriola would 






See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1157-1158. 
12
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ture. l05 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that front pay 
was appropriate in Meriola's case and that the district court 
did not err in its calculation of the award. lOS 
C. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
MERIOLA'S BACK PAY 
Meriola appealed the district court's denial of back pay in 
Gotthardt 1. 107 Meriola asserted that denying her back pay was 
clearly erroneous because she presented evidence that she lost 
168 days of work. lOS Amtrak conceded that she had lost 168 
days of work. 109 However, the district court found that Meriola 
did not prove that her absences were due to Amtrak's unlawful 
conduct. 110 
The Ninth Circuit stated that the burden of proving dam-
ages is on the plaintiff. III Accordingly, Meriola had to prove, 
not simply that she missed work, but that her absences were 
due to Amtrak's discrimination. 112 Meriola's missed work arose 
from her removal from service after she could not qualify for 
the Oakland-Santa Barbara Route and a disciplinary suspen-
105 
See id. at 1158. Interestingly, there is also a circuit split on whether collateral 
benefits, such as disability, should be taken into account when calculating front pay. 
See id (citing Lussier v. Runyon, 50 F.3d 1103, 1107-1108 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that 
courts should deduct such benefits from front pay awards) and Hamlin v. Charter 
Township of Flint, 165 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that courts are prohibited 
from deducting collateral benefits from front pay». The Ninth Circuit did not have to 
decide this issue here because Amtrak's assertion that Meriola would be entitled to 
disability benefits was speculative. See id. 
106 
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1158. 
107 See id. Back pay is the difference between what the plaintiff actually earned 
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sion of 56 days for a rule violation. 113 She did not prove that 
these instances were the result of Amtrak's discrimination. 114 
As to Meriola's removal, Amtrak had a legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reason for removing Meriola from service: she was un-
able to handle the route safely.1l5 Thus, it was her lack of skill 
on the route, not discrimination, that resulted in her missed 
work. 116 As to the 56 day suspension, Meriola alleged that the 
usual suspension for similar violations was 30 days. 117 How-
ever, the district court found that the difference in treatment 
was not discriminatory because other engineers had received 
similar suspensions for the same violations.118 Thus, because 
Meriola could not prove her damages, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's denial of back pay in Gotthardt 1. 119 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit wisely joined the majority of circuit 
courts in holding that the section 1981a caps do not apply to 
front pay awards. Because the United States Supreme Court 
recently denied a petition for certiorari on this issue,120 the 
split in the circuits remains. The Court should therefore grant 
certiorari on the next available opportunity to definitively de-
termine whether front pay awards are subject to the section 
1981a caps. Until such a resolution occurs, the calculation of 
front pay will continue to depend on where a Title VII plaintiff 
happens to suffer discrimination. It is not likely that the 
drafters of section 1981a intended this result. 
113 




See id. at 1158-1159. 
116 
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1158-1159. 
117 
See id. at 1159. 
118 
See id. 
119 S id ee . 
120 See Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 555 (lOth Cir. 1999), pet. for 
cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 48 (l999). 
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In resolving the circuit split, the Court should follow the 
reasoning of the Ninth Circuit and majority.121 While the Sixth 
Circuit's statement that a future pecuniary loss could only be 
front pay122 is a plausible reason to include front pay in the 
caps, the Ninth Circuit persuasively concluded that plain lan-
guage and legislative history of section 1981a indicate that 
front pay awards are excluded from the caps. 123 In addition, 
the Court should defer to the EEOC's determination that front 
pay is not subject to the section 1981a caps.124 
Jennifer T. De Witt· 
121 
See supra notes 59-82 and accompanying text. 
122 
See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. 
123 
See supra notes 59-82 and accompanying text. 
124 
See Gotthardt at 1154 n.6 (citing EEOC: Policy Guidance on Compensatory and 
Punitive Damages under 1991 Civil Rights Act, 8 Lab. ReI. Rep. Fair Empl. Prac. 
Manual (BNA) 405:7091,7094 (July 7,1992) . 
• J.D., Golden Gate University School of Law, 2000. B.A., Anthropology, DePauw 
University,1996. Editor-in-Chief, Golden Gate University Law Review. Many thanks 
to Scott Sanford for his hard work on the Ninth Circuit Survey issue and his helpful 
comments on this summary. In memory of Ruth Elizabeth Smith, whose grace and 
strength continue to inspire me. 
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